



 –  1  –  
PUBLISHED IN: International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 
(IIC) 47, No. 8 (2016), 941-959;  
available at link.springer.com: http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40319-016-0524-3 







Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing? Trade Mark Rights Against Goods in Transit 
and the End of Traditional Territorial Limits 
 
 
The December 2015 reform of EU trade mark law led to the introduction of a new exclusive 
right against goods in transit in Article 9(4) of the EU Trade Mark Regulation and Article 
10(4) of the Trade Mark Directive. This new right raises complex questions of compliance 
with the international guarantee of freedom of transit set forth in Article V GATT. In the light 
of the applicable international provisions, the status of the new right against goods in transit 
must at least be qualified as ambiguous. It is conceivable that it will be challenged on the 
ground that it leads to an unjustified impediment of international trade. As the new EU trade 
mark legislation requires the application of Article 9(4) of the EU Trade Mark Regulation 
and Article 10(4) of the Trade Mark Directive in line with international standards, in 
particular Article V GATT, courts will have to face the complexity of the international legal 
framework and develop workable solutions by applying an amalgam of EU and international 
law. The result of this exercise will show whether the potential corrosive effect of the new 
right can be kept within reasonable limits. An overambitious interpretation would unmask the 





In the EU, the recent trade mark law reform
1
 led to a broader arsenal of specific infringement 
actions complementing the traditional general types of protection against confusion and 
dilution.
2
 As a result of the trade mark law reform, Article 9(4) of the EU Trade Mark 
Regulation (EUTMR) and Article 10(4) of the Trade Mark Directive (TMD) provide for a 
specific trade mark action against goods in transit. With the inclusion of this new specific 
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right in its proposal for amending EU trade mark law,
3
 the European Commission sought to 
neutralize the implications of the Philips and Nokia judgment of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU).
4
 According to the Commission, the decision had met with “strong 
criticism from stakeholders as placing an inappropriately high burden of proof on rights 
holders, and hindering the fight against counterfeiting.”
5
 It was evident that there was “an 
urgent need to have in place a European legal framework enabling a more effective fight 
against the counterfeiting of goods as a fast-growing activity.”
6
 Hence, the Commission 
proposed to fill the perceived protection gap by entitling right holders to invoke trade mark 
rights enjoying protection in the EU regardless of whether allegedly infringing goods are 
released for free circulation in the internal market.  
 
This proposal went beyond the solution that had been recommended in the preparatory work 
for the EU trade mark law reform. Considering the international guarantee of freedom of 
transit, the MPI Study on the Overall Functioning of the European Trade Mark System had 
proposed to limit rights against goods in transit to counterfeit goods in the sense of the TRIPS 
Agreement and make it a condition that the conflicting sign at issue be infringing not only in 
the territory of transit but also in the country of destination.
7
 In the course of the legislative 
process,
8
 these nuances were added to Article 9(4) EUTMR and Article 10(4) TMD. The final 
text of the provisions entitles the trade mark proprietor 
 
“…to prevent all third parties from bringing goods, in the course of trade, into the Member 
State where the trade mark is registered without being released for free circulation there, 
where such goods, including packaging, come from third countries and bear without 
authorization a trade mark which is identical to the trade mark registered in respect of such 
goods, or which cannot be distinguished in its essential aspects from that trade mark.”  
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2. CJEU Jurisprudence  
 
With this new infringement provision, the EU legislator departs from established CJEU case 
law which favours the freedom of transit.
9
 In Rioglass, the Court ruled that the transit of car 
windows and window screens lawfully manufactured in Spain and destined for a customer in 
Poland (which, at the time, was a non-Member country) by passing through France did not 
involve any marketing of the goods in France and, therefore, was not liable to infringe “the 
specific subject-matter of the trade mark.”
10
 Hence, a measure of detention under customs 
control in France could not be justified on the ground that is was necessary to protect 
industrial and commercial property within the meaning of Article 36 of the Treaty on the 




In Class International, the CJEU pointed out that measures against goods in transit could only 
be justified in cases where the customs-approved treatment or use would adversely affect 
trade mark rights in the EU. However, placing non-Union goods under a suspensive customs 
procedure did not make it possible for them to be put on the internal market in the absence of 
release for free circulation. Therefore, a trade mark proprietor could not oppose the mere 
entry into the EU, under the external transit procedure or the customs warehousing procedure, 
of goods bearing an allegedly infringing sign. Moreover, the trade mark proprietor could not 
make the placing of non-Union goods under the external transit procedure or the customs 
warehousing procedure conditional on the existence, at the time of the introduction of those 
goods into the EU, of a final destination already specified in a third country, possibly pursuant 




As to the transit of goods from a non-member State to Ireland (where the trade mark at issue 
did not enjoy protection) through German territory (where it enjoyed protection), the CJEU 
held in Montex v. Diesel that the trade mark proprietor could only assert his rights if the goods 
were subject of an act necessarily entailing that they would be put on the market in the 
Member State of transit (Germany).
13
 It was immaterial in this context whether the goods had 
been manufactured lawfully in the country of origin or in infringement of trade mark rights 
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which the trade mark proprietor could invoke in that country as well.
14
 For assessing the 




In its further decision in Philips and Nokia, the CJEU generalized this approach. The Court 
found that goods placed under a suspensive customs procedure could not, “merely by the fact 
of being so placed, infringe intellectual property rights applicable in the European Union.”
16
 It 
also made it clear that intellectual property rights could only be infringed “where, during their 
placement under a suspensive procedure […], or even before their arrival […], goods coming 
from non-member States are the subject of a commercial act directed at European Union 
consumers, such as a sale, offer for sale or advertising.”
17
 It thus seemed clear that goods in 
transit would remain unaffected by intellectual property rights enjoying protection in the EU, 
including trade mark rights, as long as they remained in transit and would not be diverted 
towards EU consumers. In the case of national or Benelux trade mark rights, this requirement 
has been interpreted in the sense that the allegedly infringing goods must be directed towards 




In Philips and Nokia, the CJEU also nuanced its approach to transit goods by pointing out that 
a customs authority could legitimately take steps against goods in transit if there was material 
indicating that one or more of the operators involved in the manufacture, consignment or 
distribution of the goods were about to direct the goods towards EU consumers or were 
disguising their commercial intentions. Such a suspicion could follow from the fact that the 
destination of the goods were not declared whereas the suspensive procedure requested 
required such a declaration, the lack of precise or reliable information as to the identity or 
address of the manufacturer or consignor of the goods, a lack of co-operation with the 
customs authorities or the discovery of documents or correspondence suggesting that the 




However, an abstract consideration that fraudulent diversion to EU consumers could not be 
ruled out, was not sufficient. Otherwise, all goods in external transit or customs warehousing 
could be detained “without the slightest concrete indication of an irregularity.”
20
 Such a 
situation would give rise to a risk that customs actions in the EU would be random and 
excessive. In this regard, the CJEU recalled explicitly that “imitations and copies coming 
from a non-member State and transported to another non-member State may comply with the 
intellectual property provisions in force in each of those States.”
21
 In the light of the objective 
set out in Article 206 TFEU to develop world trade through the progressive abolition of 
restrictions on trade, it was essential that goods be able to pass in transit, via the EU, from one 
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non-member State to another “without that operation being hindered, even by a temporary 




3. International Dimension 
 
At the time, this confirmation of the freedom of transit constituted not only an important 
clarification of applicable EU law but also an important signal at the international level. As a 
result of the seizure of a shipment of the generic drug Losartan on its way from India to Brazil 
by customs authorities in Amsterdam, practices of seizing goods in transit in the EU had been 




As a justification for the seizure in Amsterdam, the customs authorities could point to 
European patent rights of DuPont and Merck Sharp & Dohme. These rights, however, did 
enjoy protection neither in Brazil nor in India. The seizure itself rested on the so-called 
“manufacturing fiction” allowing Dutch customs authorities to assume that goods in transit 
have been produced in the country of transit (instead of the country of origin) when assessing 
an infringement of intellectual property rights. The Dutch Supreme Court had established the 
manufacturing fiction in Philips v. Postech – a case concerning the seizure of recordable CDs 
which had been in transit via the Netherlands on their way from Taiwan to Switzerland. 
Seeking to offer Philips the opportunity to invoke patent rights enjoying protection in the 
Netherlands against the goods in transit, the Dutch Supreme Court held in Philips v. Postech 
that the infringement analysis could be based on the assumption that the CDs had been 




Opposing the application of the manufacturing fiction in the Losartan case, India, Brazil, 
several other developing countries and the Indian producer Dr Reddy’s Laboratories qualified 
the transit seizure of Losartan as an attempt to artificially extend the territorial scope of EU 
patent rights and impede international trade.
25
 In May 2010, India and Brazil formally 
complained before the WTO about the seizure of generic medicines in transit in the EU.
26
 
Ultimately, the case did not lead to a Panel Report under the WTO dispute settlement system. 
In the light of the CJEU decision in Philips and Nokia, there seemed to be little doubt that 
incidents, such as the seizure of Losartan in Amsterdam, belonged to the past. In the amended 
EU Customs Regulation No 608/2013, it was stated in Recital 11 that the seizure of medicines 
in transit required a “substantial likelihood of diversion of such medicines onto the market of 
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4. Specific EU Trade Mark Action 
 
Against this background, it is surprising that the amendment of EU trade mark legislation has 
led to a new right of trade mark owners to take measures against goods in transit. Despite the 
international criticism triggered by the seizure of goods in transit in the Losartan case, EU 
policy makers decided to extend the scope of the exclusive rights of trade mark owners to 
goods in transit. As explained above, Article 9(4) EUTMR and Article 10(4) TMD entitle the 
trade mark proprietor “to prevent all third parties from bringing goods, in the course of trade, 
into the Member State where the trade mark is registered without being released for free 
circulation there, where such goods, including packaging, come from third countries and bear 
without authorization a trade mark which is identical to the trade mark registered in respect of 
such goods, or which cannot be distinguished in its essential aspects from that trade mark.” 
 
In this context, the requirement of the conflicting sign being “identical to the trade mark 
registered in respect of such goods, or which cannot be distinguished in its essential aspects 
from that trade mark” makes it clear that the drafters intended to confine the scope of the 
provision to counterfeit goods. The formulation corresponds with the international definition 
of “counterfeit trademark goods” in footnote 14 of the TRIPS Agreement which accompanies 
the TRIPS provisions on border measures. 
 
Admittedly, the Losartan case concerned patent rights. Article 9(4) EUTMR and Article 10(4) 
TMD deal with trade mark rights. While a patent protects a product incorporating a new 
technical solution as such, a trade mark only protects a sign identifying the commercial source 
of that product. This difference may have led EU policy makers to believe that, in practice, it 
would be easier to keep a sufficient distance from an EU trade mark than to invent around a 
patent that is protected in the EU. However, this assumption is doubtful in the case of generic 
medicine and the legitimate resale of genuine pharmaceutical products after the exhaustion of 
trade mark rights – cases where a reference to the trade-marked name of the original product 
may be necessary to inform consumers appropriately.
28
 The assumption is also doubtful 
because trade mark rights increasingly acquire the status of products in their own right. As a 
result of substantial investment in marketing and advertising, the mark becomes a central part 
of the product, if not the main product feature in the eyes of consumers.
29
 Moreover, the basic 
                                                 
28
 Not surprisingly, this kind of cases generated quite some case law. In particular, see CJEU, 11 July 1996, 
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141. 
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experience and goodwill, see M.A. Lemley/M.P. McKenna, “Owning Mark(et)s”, Michigan Law Review 109 
(2010), 137 (#); B. Beebe, “Intellectual Property Law and the Sumptuary Code”, Harvard Law Review 123 
(2010), 809 (848-859); M.R.F. Senftleben, “The Trademark Tower of Babel – Dilution Concepts in 
International, US and EC Trademark Law”, IIC 40 (2009), 45 (59); L. Bently/J. Davis/J.C. Ginsburg (eds.), 
Trade Marks and Brands – An Interdisciplinary Critique, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2008, 241; 
G.B. Dinwoodie/M.D. Janis, Dilution’s (Still) Uncertain Future, Michigan Law Review First Impressions 105 
(2006), 98; B. Beebe, “Search and Persuasion in Trademark Law”, Michigan Law Review 103 (2005), 2020; M. 
Strasser, “The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection Revisited: Putting the Dilution Doctrine into Context”, 
Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal 10 (2000), 375; R.S. Brown, “Advertising 
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problem remains the same irrespective of differences in the configuration of patent and trade 
mark rights: a territorially limited intellectual property right enjoying protection in the EU is 
used as a universal yardstick to determine whether goods in transit constitute “counterfeit” 
goods. Although the goods are destined for another country, the question of counterfeiting is 
thus answered on the basis of the rights portfolio in the EU. In consequence, a manufacturer 
of goods seeking to ensure a smooth transit via the EU will have to avoid a conflict with an 
EU trade mark right even though he may be free to use an identical or very similar sign in the 
country of final destination. Similar to patent rights, trade mark rights may thus play the role 
of “wolves” rather than merely constituting “sheep” that ensure fair competition, safeguard 
market transparency and protect consumers against confusion.  
 
The territorial scope of trade mark rights enjoying protection in the EU is thus artificially 
extended. If this strategy of enhancing the impact of EU trade mark rights on world trade is 
applied systematically, a certain degree of de facto protection of EU trade marks beyond the 
borders of the European Union can hardly be denied. Concerns about an encroachment upon 
the international guarantee of the freedom of transit are thus not unfounded – even if Article 
9(4) EUTMR and Article 9(4) TMD “merely” concern trade mark rights which serve as 
identifiers of commercial source.  
 
Considerations of this kind are not completely absent from the context surrounding the new 
specific trade mark right. In the light of the concerns about an undue curtailment of the 
international freedom of trade, the EU legislator sought to soften the effect of the new transit 
provisions. Apart from granting an exclusive right, Article 9(4) EUTMR and Article 10(4) 
TMD also stipulate that the entitlement of seizing goods in transit shall lapse  
 
“…if during the proceedings to determine whether the registered trade mark has been 
infringed, initiated in accordance with the provisions of Regulation (EU) No 608/2013 
concerning customs enforcement of intellectual property rights, evidence is provided by the 
declarant or the holder of the goods that the proprietor of the registered trade mark is not 
entitled to prohibit the placing of the goods on the market in the country of final destination.” 
 
EU law thus seeks to safeguard the freedom of trade by imposing the obligation on a trader 
confronted with a transit seizure to show that the owner of a trade mark right in the EU does 
not have a corresponding right in the country of final destination. While this additional rule 
may have been deemed a sufficient concession during the legislative process, it may raise 
more problems than it solves in practice. 
 
4.1 Burden of proof 
 
The distribution of the burden of proof set forth in Article 9(4) EUTMR and Article 10(4) 
TMD is remarkable. On its merits, it reflects a bias in favour of the owner of trade mark rights 
in the EU. For the purposes of Article 9(4) EUTMR and Article 10(4) TMD, there seems to be 
a presumption that trade mark rights enjoying protection in (a part of) the EU also enjoy 
                                                                                                                                                        
M. Lemley, “The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense”, Yale Law Journal 108 (1999), 1687 
(1694-1698); G.S. Lunney, Jr., “Trademark Monopolies”, Emory Law Journal 48 (1999), 367 (437-439); R.C. 
Dreyfuss, “We Are Symbols and Inhabit Symbols, so Should we be Paying Rent? Deconstructing the Lanham 
Act and Rights of Publicity”, Columbia-VLA Journal of Law & Arts 20 (1996), 123 (128); R. Dreyfuss, 
“Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi Generation”, Notre Dame Law Review 65 (1990), 
397 (413-414). As to the foundations of the dilution doctrine, see F.I. Schechter, “The Rational Basis of 
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protection in other parts of the world. Given this presumption, the declarant or the holder of 
the seized goods has to carry the burden of proving that such a right does not exist in the 
country of final destination. Article 9(4) EUTMR and Article 10(4) TMD require evidence 
“that the proprietor of the registered trade mark is not entitled to prohibit the placing of the 
goods on the market in the country of final destination.”  
 
With this distribution of the burden of proof, Article 9(4) EUTMR and Article 10(4) TMD 
depart from the standard rule that the right holder – in this case the trade mark proprietor – 
must present all necessary evidence to support his infringement claim. As the goods are 
merely in transit in the EU and the infringement would finally take place in the country of 
final destination, it would have been more consistent to impose the burden of producing 
evidence of infringement in the country of final destination on the EU trade mark owner. 
Given the fact that intellectual property rights are territorially limited, goods that appear as 
“counterfeit trademark goods” in the light of EU trade mark rights may nonetheless be 
legitimate abroad if the right holder failed to secure corresponding trade mark rights in the 




Irrespective of these concerns about an unjustified bias in favour of EU trade mark owners, 
the distribution of the burden of proof can be explained with practical considerations. If the 
transit seizure really concerns counterfeit goods, the declarant or the holder of the goods is 
unlikely to take any steps. Practically speaking, it may thus make sense to impose the burden 
of proving the absence of infringement on the affected trader in order to separate the wheat 
from the chaff. If the declarant or the holder of the goods makes an effort to demonstrate non-
infringement in the country of final destination, this fact alone might already indicate that the 
affected trader is not a counterfeiter. 
 
Nonetheless, the fact remains that, on its merits, the responsibility for keeping international 
trade intact is to be borne by the trader who is confronted with a transit seizure in the EU.
31
 
This trader must produce proof of the absence of a trade mark infringement in the country of 
final destination. Moreover, a relatively light burden of proof would already have been 
sufficient to achieve the objective of separating the wheat from the chaff. In particular, it 
would have been sufficient to oblige the declarant or the holder of the goods to show that the 
trade mark at issue has not been registered in the country of final destination.  
 
Nonetheless, the open wording of Article 9(4) EUTMR and Article 10(4) TMD (“...that the 
proprietor of the registered trade mark is not entitled to prohibit the placing of the goods on 
the market in the country of final destination”) leaves room for a much broader interpretation 
of the trader’s onus of proof. Taken to the extremes, evidence of a missing entitlement in the 
country of final destination may be understood to require a comprehensive legal analysis, 
including the question of trade mark protection against confusion because of mere similarity 
of signs, protection against dilution based on a mere risk of calling to mind the protected 
mark, and the inapplicability of limitations of trade mark rights that may tip the scales in 
favour of the declarant or holder of the seized goods. However, a requirement to conduct such 
a broad analysis would create a sharp contrast with the starting point of the transit seizure. As 
explained, the new right against goods in transit only covers counterfeit goods bearing an 
                                                 
30
 H. Große Ruse-Khan, The Protection of Intellectual Property in International Law, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 2016, 295-296. 
31
 See also the critical comments by H. Große Ruse-Khan, The Protection of Intellectual Property in 
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essentially identical sign. From this outset, questions of mere similarity or mere association 
with the trade mark seem extraneous and unjustified against this background.  
 
Under a maximalist approach, the burden of proof may also be understood to include the 
question of a potential encroachment upon unregistered trade mark rights, such as rights 
concerning well-known marks in the sense of Article 6bis PC.
32
 As Article 6bis PC leads to 
protection even if there is no registration,
33
 it can be particularly difficult to ascertain the 
protection status in the country of final destination. In a country following the WIPO Joint 
Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the Protection of Well-Known Marks,
34
 the 
threshold for acquiring protection as a well-known mark will be quite low.
35
 Article 16(2) 
TRIPS stipulates that, in determining whether a trade mark is well-known, “Members shall 
take account of the knowledge of the trademark in the relevant sector of the public, including 
knowledge in the Member concerned which has been obtained as a result of the promotion of 
the trademark.” Hence, the inquiry can hardly be confined to clear-cut cases of famous marks 
that can be expected to be known by the general consuming public all around the globe. The 
trade mark proprietor in the EU may thus use the legal uncertainty surrounding the 
determination of protection as a well-known mark in the country of final destination to make 
the process of proving the absence of trade mark infringement particularly burdensome. The 
EU trade mark owner may also prolong that process by explicitly asserting protection on the 
basis of Article 6bis PC or Article 16(2) TRIPS against mere register evidence produced by 
the declarant or holder of the goods. 
 
4.2 Reference to International Freedom of Trade 
 
It seems that the drafters of Article 9(4) EUTMR and Article 10(4) TMD felt uneasy about 
this configuration of the exclusive right against transit goods themselves. They included 
several additional safeguards in the recitals accompanying the grant of the new exclusive 
right. Recital 15 EUTMR and Recital 21 TMD not only reflect the aim to “strengthen trade 
mark protection and combat counterfeiting more effectively” but also underline that this aim 
is to be achieved  
 
                                                 
32
 As to the complexity of identifying well-known marks and country differences, see World Intellectual 
Property Organization, WIPO Joint Recommendation Concerning the Protection of Well-Known Marks, WIPO 
publication No. 833, Geneva: WIPO 2000; A. Kur, “Die WIPO-Vorschläge zum Schutz bekannter und 
berühmter Marken”, GRUR 1999, 866; Senftleben 2009, 50-55. As to different concepts of “well-known” marks 
in international, EU and US law, see M.R.F. Senftleben, “The Trademark Tower of Babel – Dilution Concepts in 
International, US and EC Law”, International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 40 (2009), 
45. 
33
 As to the scope of protection envisaged at the international level, see Article 16(2) and (3) TRIPS and World 
Intellectual Property Organization, WIPO Joint Recommendation Concerning the Protection of Well-Known 
Marks, WIPO publication No. 833, Geneva: WIPO 2000. 
34
 WIPO Joint Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the Protection of Well-Known Marks, WIPO 
publication No. 833, Geneva: WIPO 2000. 
35
 As to the level of international harmonization of the standard of “well-known” and remaining differences at 
the national level, see A. Kur, “Die WIPO-Vorschläge zum Schutz bekannter und berühmter Marken”, 
Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht 1999, 866; M.R.F. Senftleben, “The Trademark Tower of Babel – 
Dilution Concepts in International, US and EC Law”, International Review of Intellectual Property and 
Competition Law 40 (2009), 45; J.T. McCarthy, “Dilution of a Trademark: European and United States Law 
Compared”, Trademark Reporter 94 (2004), 1163; B. Beebe, “A Defense of the New Federal Trademark 
Antidilution Law”, Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal 16 (2006), p. 1143 
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“…in line with international obligations of the Member States under the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) framework, in particular Article V of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade on freedom of transit and, as regards generic medicines, the ‘Declaration on the 
TRIPS Agreement and public health’ adopted by the Doha WTO Ministerial Conference on 14 
November 2001.”  
 
The reference to the Doha Declaration is understandable in the light of the aforementioned 
Losartan case that gave rise to the described delicate debate about shipments of generic 
medicines at the international level. It also forges a link with Recital 11 of the EU Customs 
Regulation No 608/2013 which confirms, in the light of the Doha Declaration, “WTO 
Members’ right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for 
all.”   
 
The direct reference to Article V GATT, however, is surprising. With this reference to an 
international free trade norm, Recital 15 EUTMR and Recital 21 TMD subject the application 
of the new exclusive right against goods in transit to a scrutiny in the light of international 
trade standards. As the application of the new right against goods in transit should be “in line 
with international obligations of the Member States under the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) framework”, it can be argued that the right cannot be invoked if this would lead to an 
encroachment upon Article V GATT. Recital 23 TMD indicates in this respect that EU policy 
makers saw the opportunity for the declarant or the holder of the seized goods to prove non-
infringement in the country of final destination and, as a result, eliminate the trade mark 
proprietor’s entitlement to seizure, as a way of reconciling “the need to ensure the effective 
enforcement of trade mark rights with the necessity to avoid hampering the free flow of trade 
in legitimate goods”. In the light of the described concerns about an overbroad interpretation 
of the trader’s onus of proof, the question arises whether this safeguard is sufficient to ensure 
compliance with Article V GATT. 
 
5. Conflict with International Freedom of Transit 
 
The regulation of the freedom of transit in Article V GATT commences in paragraph 1 with 
the following definition of “traffic in transit”:  
 
“[g]oods (including baggage), and also vessels and other means of transport, shall be deemed 
to be in transit across the territory of a contracting party when the passage across such 
territory, with or without trans-shipment, warehousing, breaking bulk, or change in the mode 
of transport, is only a portion of a complete journey beginning and terminating beyond the 
frontier of the contracting party across whose territory the traffic passes. Traffic of this nature 
is termed in this Article ‘traffic in transit’.” 
 
Based on this definition, Article V(2) GATT establishes the general rule of freedom of transit 
by positing that  
 
“[t]here shall be freedom of transit through the territory of each contracting party, via the 
routes most convenient for international transit, for traffic in transit to or from the territory of 
other contracting parties. No distinction shall be made which is based on the flag of vessels, 
the place of origin, departure, entry, exit or destination, or on any circumstances relating to 
the ownership of goods, of vessels or of other means of transport.”  
 
In Colombia – Ports of Entry, a WTO Panel clarified that this international obligation 
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the goods had been trans-shipped, warehoused, break-bulked, or had changed modes of 
transport. Goods in transit from any WTO Member had to be allowed entry for the passage of 
goods whenever destined for the territory of a third country.
36
 This freedom, however, is not 
absolute. Article V(3) GATT makes it clear that  
 
“[a]ny contracting party may require that traffic in transit through its territory be entered at 
the proper custom house, but, except in cases of failure to comply with applicable customs 
laws and regulations, such traffic coming from or going to the territory of other contracting 
parties shall not be subject to any unnecessary delays or restrictions…”  
 
On the one hand, Article V(3) GATT thus offers room to argue that the new EU trade mark 
right against goods in transit is part of the applicable set of “customs laws and regulations” 
with which traders shipping goods through the EU have to comply.
37
 On the other hand, 
Article V(3) GATT leaves little doubt that this freedom has its limits: “unnecessary delays or 
restrictions” are inacceptable and amount to a violation of the international guarantee of free 
transit. Hence, it may be argued that the procedure following the seizure of goods in transit 
leads to unnecessary delays or restrictions because it imposes the burden on affected traders to 
provide evidence of non-infringement in the country of final destination – potentially 
including evidence of the absence of sign similarity or association, and protection on the basis 




The delay caused by a transit seizure can be considerable anyway. In the Losartan case, for 
instance, the generic drugs at issue had first been held up temporarily in the Netherlands. 
Subsequently, they were returned to India instead of ensuring shipment to the intended final 
destination which was Brazil.
39
 Not surprisingly, the issue of unnecessary delays and 
restrictions of international trade featured prominently in India’s formal request for 
consultations before the WTO.
40
 As explained above, the CJEU itself emphasized in Philips 
and Nokia that, considering the policy objective to abolish trade restrictions, goods had to be 
able to pass in transit via the EU “without that operation being hindered, even by a temporary 
detention, by Member States’ customs authorities.”
41
   
 
Another reference point for casting doubt upon compliance of the new trade mark right 
against goods in transit can be found in Article V(4) GATT. According to this provision, 
“[a]ll charges and regulations imposed by contracting parties on traffic in transit to or from 
the territories of other contracting parties shall be reasonable, having regard to the conditions 
of the traffic.” This further international rule offers the possibility of arguing that the new 
trade mark right against goods in transit in the EU constitutes an unreasonable regulation: due 
to the territorial nature of trade mark rights, the EU can hardly have a legitimate interest in 
applying its territorially limited rights to goods that are not destined for EU consumers. The 
new trade mark right appears as a disproportionate attempt to embark on unjustified world 
                                                 
36
 WTO Panel, 27 April 2009, WTO Document WT/DS366/R, Colombia – Ports of Entry, para. 7.401. 
37
 However, see the serious doubts expressed by H. Große Ruse-Khan, “An international trade perspective on 
transit seizures”, BMM Bulletin 39 (2013), 142 (147). 
38
 H. Große Ruse-Khan, The Protection of Intellectual Property in International Law, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 2016, 297-299. 
39
 H. Große Ruse-Khan, “An international trade perspective on transit seizures”, BMM Bulletin 39 (2013), 142 
(142). 
40
 Request for Consultations by India, 19 May 2010, WTO Document WT/DS408/1, European Union and a 
Member State – Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit, p. 2. 
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policing
42
 – unjustified because the effort made to stop counterfeit goods is primarily based 
on trade mark rights existing in the EU. The whole question of counterfeiting is viewed 
through the prism of a protected legal position in the EU – as if legal protection in the EU 
automatically implied legal protection around the globe. 
 
5.1 Broader GATT context 
 
In the light of Article V GATT, Article 9(4) EUTMR and Article 10(4) TMD are thus 
exposed to a serious risk of challenges based on the international guarantee of the freedom of 
transit. The consideration of the broader treaty context in which Article V GATT is 
embedded, does not change this outcome of the analysis. Admittedly, Article XX(d) GATT 
offers room for the adoption and enforcement of measures  
 
“…necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with 
the provisions of this Agreement, including those relating to […] the protection of patents, 
trademarks and copyrights, and the prevention of deceptive practices…”  
 
As the TRIPS Agreement constitutes Annex 1C to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization and thus the 1994 GATT treaty package, it can hardly be deemed 
inconsistent to seek to ensure the protection of trade marks in the EU. Article 41(1) TRIPS 
further supports this argument by establishing the international obligation of contracting 
parties to  
 
“ensure that enforcement procedures as specified in this Part are available under their law so 
as to permit effective action against any act of infringement of intellectual property rights 
covered by this Agreement, including expeditious remedies to prevent infringements and 
remedies which constitute a deterrent to further infringements.”  
 
Even this escape route, however, does not offer full clarity about the compliance of Article 
9(4) EUTMR and Article 10(4) TMD with international law. Firstly, the scope of Article 
41(1) TRIPS is explicitly confined to “enforcement procedures as specified in this Part”. This 
is a reference to Part III of the TRIPS Agreement dealing with “Enforcement of intellectual 
property rights”. Within Part III, there are provisions, such as Article 51 TRIPS, which 
explicitly set forth measures against counterfeit goods. These provisions, however, are silent 
on goods in transit.
43
 Instead, Article 51 TRIPS refers to the risk of “release into free 
circulation” which, by definition, would not arise in the EU in the case of goods in transit. 
Article 51 TRIPS also reflects the possibility of taking measures against counterfeit goods 
“destined for exportation” from the territory of a contracting party, such as the EU or an EU 
Member State. However, goods in transit are not “destined for exportation”. They are simply 
on their way through the EU. The accompanying footnote 13 clarifies that Article 51 TRIPS 
should not be understood to oblige WTO Members to apply procedures for suspending the 
release of goods “to imports of goods put on the market in another country by or with the 
                                                 
42
 Cf. H. Große Ruse-Khan/T. Jäger, “Policing Patents Worldwide? EC Border Measures Against Transiting 
Generic Drugs under EC and WTO Intellectual Property Regimes”, International Review of Intellectual Property 
and Competition Law 40 (2009), 502. 
43
 H. Große Ruse-Khan, The Protection of Intellectual Property in International Law, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 2016, 309. As pointed out by F. Eijsvogels, “The new Customs Regulation, the Commission’s proposals 
relating to trademarks and transit – Back to previous Dutch practice?”, BMM Bulletin 39 (2013), 135 (141), the 
application of Articles 51 and 52 TRIPS in respect of goods in transit would require a “manufacturing fiction” 
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consent of the right holder, or to goods in transit.” Legitimate parallel trade and goods in 
transit are thus explicitly kept outside the scope of the international obligation. 
 
5.2 No Circular Line of Reasoning 
 
More generally, Article 41(1) TRIPS provides that enforcement procedures “shall be applied 
in such a manner as to avoid the creation of barriers to legitimate trade and to provide for 
safeguards against their abuse.” Similarly, the application of Article XX(d) GATT is subject 
to the proviso that the protection of patents, trade marks and copyrights, and the prevention of 
deceptive practices does not lead to measures “applied in a manner which would constitute 
[...] a disguised restriction on international trade...”  
 
These provisions prevent a circular line of reasoning. Under Article 1(1) TRIPS, WTO 
Members are free to implement more extensive protection than required by the TRIPS 
Agreement, “provided that such protection does not contravene the provisions of this 
Agreement.” In principle, the EU thus enjoys the freedom of providing for protection against 
goods in transit even though this protection is not reflected in the TRIPS Agreement itself.
44
 
This freedom, however, must not be misused to frustrate objectives underlying the 
Agreement. As Article 41(1) TRIPS and the broader GATT context demonstrate, the 
avoidance of barriers to legitimate trade is one of these objectives. Goods that appear as 
“counterfeit trademark goods” from an EU perspective, however, may be legitimate from the 
perspective of foreign trade mark systems. Hence, the EU is not free to impose its own 
assessment of counterfeit goods on other countries. 
 
If Article 10(4) EUTMR and Article 9(4) TMD are regarded as a “barrier to legitimate trade” 
or a “disguised restriction on international trade”, a potential attempt to justify the new 
exclusive right of EU trade mark owners in the light of the enforcement provisions of the 
TRIPS Agreement is thus doomed to fail from the outset.
45
 As Henning Große Ruse-Khan 
concludes, “good arguments support a finding that an expansion of IP rights to cover as 
infringement the mere transit of goods without any further connection to the territory of the 
IP-granting state, in particular any evidence for the goods being diverted onto the domestic 
market, is inconsistent with Art. V GATT. Such an expansion in itself can further not be 




5.3 Cautious Approach Required 
 
The new exclusive right of trade mark proprietors in the EU against goods in transit thus 
raises complex questions of compliance with the international guarantee of freedom of transit 
set forth in Article V GATT. In the light of the applicable international provisions, the status 
of the new trade mark right in the EU must at least be qualified as ambiguous. It is 
conceivable that the invocation of the right will be challenged at the WTO on the ground that 
                                                 
44
 F. Eijsvogels, “The new Customs Regulation, the Commission’s proposals relating to trademarks and transit – 
Back to previous Dutch practice?”, BMM Bulletin 39 (2013), 135 (141). 
45
 In this sense H. Große Ruse-Khan, The Protection of Intellectual Property in International Law, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 2016, 309. Cf. also H. Große Ruse-Khan/T. Jäger, “Policing Patents Worldwide? EC 
Border Measures Against Transiting Generic Drugs under EC and WTO Intellectual Property Regimes”, 
International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 40 (2009), 502 (524-530), who see the 
TRIPS Agreement as an international “ceiling” barring the adoption of border measures against goods in transit. 
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it leads to an unjustified impediment of international trade. As the new EU trade mark 
legislation requires the application of Article 9(4) EUTMR and Article 10(4) TMD in line 
with international standards, in particular Article V GATT, courts in the EU will have to cope 
with the complexity of the international legal framework and develop workable solutions by 
applying an amalgam of EU and international law. The final result – and perhaps the most 
practical solution – may be an exclusive right with a rather limited scope. Given the serious 
risk of an encroachment upon the international freedom of transit, a cautious approach is 
advisable when applying Article 9(4) EUTMR and Article 10(4) TMD.  
 
In particular, courts will have to take into account the necessity test following from Article 
XX(d) GATT. As explained, a transit seizure must be “necessary” to secure compliance with 
domestic laws protecting trade mark rights in order to be justified under international law. 
However, the necessity test of Article XX(d) GATT cannot be met in the case of goods 
destined for a country outside the EU. By definition, an encroachment upon EU trade mark 
rights is excluded in such a case.
47
 A seizure of transit goods can only be necessary, if there is 
a substantial likelihood of diversion onto the EU market. Hence, the new right granted in 
Article 9(4) EUTMR and Article 10(4) TMD can hardly go beyond the standard of protection 
reached in the Philips and Nokia decision of the CJEU.
48
 Considering the international 
guarantee of free transit, the status quo established in Philips and Nokia should thus remain 
unchanged to the greatest extent possible. 
 
If a broader scope of application is nonetheless deemed possible under the new exclusive 
right, the described prohibition of unnecessary delays or restrictions following from Article 
V(3) GATT, in any case, precludes the imposition of a heavy burden of proof with regard to 
non-infringement in the country of final destination. As explained above, proof including the 
absence of sign similarity or association, and protection on the basis of Article 6bis PC or 
Article 16(2) TRIPS is unnecessary and disproportionate for achieving the practical result of 
separating the wheat from the chaff by obliging the declarant or holder of the goods to 
actively take steps against the transit seizure. Hence, the burden of proof must be limited, for 
instance, by confining the inquiry to trade marks registered in the country of final destination. 
 
5.4 Medicinal Products 
 
Considering the explicit reference to the Doha Declaration in Recital 15 EUTMR, Recital 21 
TMD and Recital 11 EU Customs Regulation No 608/2013, a cautious approach observing – 
to the greatest extent possible – the limits set forth in Philips and Nokia is of even bigger 
importance when the goods at issue are medicinal products.
49
 Not surprisingly, Recital 19 
EUTMR and Recital 25 TMD insist on appropriate measures to ensure the smooth transit of 
generic medicines. These recitals clarify that with respect to international non-proprietary 
names (INNs), the trade mark proprietor should not have the right to prevent a third party 
from bringing transit goods into the EU on the basis of similarities between the INN for the 
active ingredient in the medicines and the trade mark. 
 
                                                 
47
 Cf. H. Große Ruse-Khan, “An international trade perspective on transit seizures”, BMM Bulletin 39 (2013), 
142 (148); H. Große Ruse-Khan, The Protection of Intellectual Property in International Law, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 2016, 310. 
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 CJEU, 1 December 2011, cases C-446/09 and C-495/09, Philips and Nokia, para. 57. 
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 Cf. H. Große Ruse-Khan/T. Jäger, “Policing Patents Worldwide? EC Border Measures Against Transiting 
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At the international level, the need to keep INNs free has explicitly been recognized. In 1993, 
the World Health Assembly endorsed resolution WHA46.19 which states that trade marks 
should not be derived from INNs and INN stems should not be used as trade marks. It was 
recognized in this context that use of INNs should remain in the public domain because a 
practice of using INNs as trade marks could frustrate the rational selection of INNs and 
ultimately compromise the safety of patients by promoting confusion in drug nomenclature. 
Lists of Proposed and Recommended INNs are published regularly following meetings of the 




Hence, the clarification in Recital 19 EUTMR and Recital 25 TMD that a transit seizure 
cannot be based on similarities between an INN and a protected trade mark seeks to exclude 
the strategic use of drug brand names which are based on the INN for the active ingredient in 
the medicine, as a weapon against generic drugs in transit using the same INN.
51
 Producers of 
generic medicines should not be forced to avoid the use of an INN to ensure the smooth 
transit via the EU.  
 
While this objective is laudable,
52
 the need to highlight this self-evident result in Recital 19 
EUTMR and Recital 25 TMD sheds light on the inroads made into the freedom of transit. The 
freedom of using INNs might be preserved. Outside the field of INNs, however, producers of 
generic medicines will have to take EU trade marks into account to avoid a delay of the 
shipment through the EU. To ensure a smooth transit without burdensome procedures and a 
lengthy exchange of arguments about trade mark protection in the country of final destination, 
a producer of generic medicines will have to check the pharmaceutical trade marks enjoying 
protection in the EU and refrain from the use of (essentially) identical signs insofar as this is 
possible without compromising the adequacy of consumer information. The EU thus imposes 
its own trade marks as a reference point for judging the legitimacy of trade marks used on 





In the light of the international guarantee of the freedom of transit in Article V GATT, the 
new trade mark right against goods in transit granted in Article 9(4) EUTMR and Article 
10(4) TMD is particularly problematic. Its application entails the risk of encroaching upon the 
freedom of transit and impeding international trade. Against this background, a cautious 
approach is necessary seeking to preserve the status quo reached in the EU after the CJEU 
decision in Philips and Nokia. This result can be achieved on the basis of a restrictive 
interpretation of the new right in line with the international obligation to guarantee the 
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of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences 66 (2011), p. 468. 
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freedom of transit, as reflected in Recital 15 EUTMR and Recital 21 TMD. In particular, it is 
of crucial importance to take into account that the starting point for the transit seizure is the 
qualification of the goods concerned as counterfeit goods bearing an essentially identical sign. 
Accordingly, the burden of proof imposed on the declarant or holder of the seized goods must 
also remain confined to the question whether the goods would be regarded as counterfeit in 
the country of final destination.  
 
In other words, the burden of proof must not be misunderstood to require a comprehensive 
legal analysis, including the question of trade mark protection against confusion because of 
mere similarity of signs, and protection against dilution based on a mere risk of calling to 
mind the protected mark. With regard to limitations of trade mark protection that may support 
the activities of the declarant or holder, it should be sufficient to provide evidence of the 
existence of relevant exemptions in the country of final destination to dissolve the assumption 
that the trade mark proprietor can take steps against the marketing of the goods. In addition, 
the burden of proof should not include the question of a potential encroachment upon 
unregistered trade mark rights, such as rights concerning well-known marks in the sense of 
Article 6bis PC. By contrast, it should be sufficient for the declarant or holder of the goods to 
show that the trade mark is not registered in the country of final destination. 
 
The described risk of an impediment of world trade because of unnecessary delays caused by 
an overbroad burden of proof is not confined to the EU territory. Potential trans-regional 
repercussions of an evolving EU practice of seizing goods in transit must be factored into the 
equation. Article 18.76.5 of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) stipulates that 
each Contracting Party to that Agreement  
 
“shall provide that its competent authorities may initiate border measures ex officio with 
respect to goods under customs control that are: 
(a) imported; 
(b) destined for export; or 
(c) in transit;  
and that are suspected of being counterfeit trademark goods or pirated copyright goods.” 
 
Admittedly, this provision only concerns an optional seizure of goods in transit (“may initiate 
border measures”) that remains at the discretion of customs authorities.
53
 Nonetheless, it 
cannot be ruled out that the implementation of the TPP leads to a proliferation of the practice 
of transit seizures. An overbroad application of Article 9(4) EUTMR and Article 10(4) TMD 
in the EU may thus be a dangerous precedent. If EU customs authorities give a bad example 
of transit seizures, this practice could finally lead to even broader inroads into the 
international guarantee of free transit. If countries in the trans-Pacific region adopt a similar 
approach, the territorial limits of intellectual property rights will increasingly be blurred and 
intellectual property will become an increasingly heavy burden for world trade. Also from this 
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broader perspective, a particularly cautious approach to Article 9(4) EUTMR and Article 
10(4) TMD is indispensable.  
